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Abstract
Deep neural networks are known to be overconfident when applied to out-of-
distribution (OOD) inputs which clearly do not belong to any class. This is a
problem in safety-critical applications since a reliable assessment of the uncertainty
of a classifier is a key property, allowing to trigger human intervention or to transfer
into a safe state. In this paper, we are aiming for certifiable worst case guarantees
for OOD detection by enforcing not only low confidence at the OOD point but also
in an l∞-ball around it. For this purpose, we use interval bound propagation (IBP)
to upper bound the maximal confidence in the l∞-ball and minimize this upper
bound during training time. We show that non-trivial bounds on the confidence for
OOD data generalizing beyond the OOD dataset seen at training time are possible.
Moreover, in contrast to certified adversarial robustness which typically comes
with significant loss in prediction performance, certified guarantees for worst case
OOD detection are possible without much loss in accuracy.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks are the state-of-the-art in many application areas. Nevertheless it is still a
major concern to use deep learning in safety-critical systems, e.g. medical diagnosis or self-driving
cars, since it has been shown that deep learning classifiers suffer from a number of unexpected
failure modes, such as low robustness to natural perturbations [12, 17], overconfident predictions
[31, 14, 18, 16] as well as adversarial vulnerabilities [36]. For safety critical applications, empirical
checks are not sufficient in order to trust a deep learning system in a high-stakes decision. Thus
provable guarantees on the behavior of a deep learning system are needed.
One property that one expects from a robust classifier is that it should not make highly confident
predictions on data that is very different from the training data. However, ReLU networks have been
shown to be provably overconfident far away from the training data [16]. This is a big problem
as (guaranteed) low confidence of a classifier when it operates out of its training domain can be
used to trigger human intervention or to let the system try to achieve a safe state when it “detects”
that it is applied outside of its specification. Several approaches to the out-of-distribution (OOD)
detection task have been studied [18, 25, 23, 24, 16]. The current state-of-the-art performance of
OOD detection in image classification is achieved by enforcing low confidence on a large training set
of natural images that is considered as out-distribution [19, 28].
Deep neural networks are also notoriously susceptible to small adversarial perturbations in the
input [36, 4] which change the decision of a classifier. Research so far has concentrated on adversarial
robustness around the in-distribution. Several empirical defenses have been proposed but many could
be broken again [8, 3, 1]. Adversarial training and variations [27, 42] perform well empirically, but
typically no robustness guarantees can be given. Certified adversarial robustness has been achieved
by explicit computation of robustness certificates [15, 38, 33, 29, 13] and randomized smoothing [6].
Adversarial changes to generate high confidence predictions on the out-distribution have received
much less attention although it has been shown early on that they can be used to fool a classifier
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Figure 1: Overconfident predictions on out-distribution inputs. Left: On the in-distribution
CIFAR-10 all methods have similar high confidence on the image of a dog. Middle: For the out-
distribution image of a chimpanzee from CIFAR-100 the plain model is overconfident. Right: When
maximizing the confidence inside the l∞-ball of radius 0.01 around this image (for the OE model),
also CCU and OE become overconfident. ACET and our GOOD80 perform well in having empirical
low confidence, but only GOOD80 guarantees that the confidence in the l∞-ball of radius 0.01 around
the middle image is less than 15.5% for any class (note that 10% corresponds to maximal uncertainty).
[31, 34, 35]. Thus, even if a classifier consistently manages to identify samples as not belonging to
the in-distribution, it might still assign very high confidence to only marginally perturbed samples
from the out-distribution, see Figure ??. A first empirical defense using a type of adversarial training
for OOD detection has been proposed in [16]. However, up to our knowledge in the area of certified
out-of-distribution detection the only robustness guarantees for OOD were given in [28], where they
use a density estimator for in- and out-distribution and integrate that into the predictive uncertainty of
the neural network, which allows them to guarantee that far away from the training data the confidence
of the neural network becomes uniform over the classes. Moreover, they can provide worst case
guarantees on the confidence on some balls around uniform noise. However, they are not able to
provide meaningful guarantees around points which are similar or even close to the in-distribution
data and, as we will show, provide only weak guarantees against l∞-adversaries.
In this work we aim to provide worst-case OOD guarantees not only for noise but also for images
from related but different image classification tasks. For this purpose we use the techniques from
interval bound propagation (IBP) [13] to derive a provable upper bound on the maximal confidence
of the classifier in an l∞-ball of radius  around a given point. By minimizing this bound on the
out-distribution using our training scheme GOOD (Guaranteed Out-Of-distribution Detection) we
arrive at the first models which have guaranteed low confidence even on image classification tasks
related to the original one; e.g., we get state-of-the-art results on separating letters from EMNIST
from digits in MNIST even though the digit classifier has never seen any images of letters at training
time. In particular, the guarantees for the training out-distribution generalize to other out-distribution
datasets. In contrast to classifiers which have certified adversarial robustness on the in-distribution,
GOOD has the desirable property to achieve provable guarantees for OOD detection with almost no
loss in accuracy on the in-distribution task even on datasets like CIFAR-10.
2 Out-of-distribution detection: setup and baselines
Let f : Rd → RK be a feedforward neural network (DNN) with a last linear layer where d is the
input dimension and K the number of classes. In all experiments below we use the ReLU activation
function. The logits of f(x) for x ∈ Rd are transformed via the softmax function into a probability
distribution p(x) over the classes with:
pk(x) :=
efk(x)∑K
l=1 e
fl(x)
for k = 1, . . . ,K. (1)
By Conff (x) = maxk=1,...,K pk(x) we define the confidence of the classifier f in the prediction
argmaxk=1,...,K pk(x) at x.
The general goal of OOD detection is to have low confidence predictions for all inputs x which are
clearly not belonging to the in-distribution task, especially for all inputs lying in a region which
has zero probability under the in-distribution. One typical criterion to measure OOD detection
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performance is to use Conff (x) as a feature and compute the AUC of in- versus out-distribution
(how well are confidences of in- and out-distribution separated). We discuss a proper conservative
measurement of the AUC in case of indistinguishable confidence values, e.g. due to numerical
precision, in Appendix C.
As baselines and motivation for our provable approach we use the OOD detection methods Outlier
Exposure (OE) [19] and Confidence Enhancing Data Augmentation (CEDA) [16], which use as
objective for training
1
N
N∑
i=1
LCE(xINi , yINi ) +
κ
M
M∑
j=1
LOUT(xOUTj ) , (2)
where
{
(xINi , y
IN
i ) | 1 ≤ i ≤ N
}
is the in-distribution training set,
{
xOUTj | 1 ≤ j ≤M
}
the out-
distribution training set, and LCE the cross-entropy loss. The hyper-parameter κ determines the
relative magnitude of the two loss terms and is most of the time chosen to be one. OE and CEDA
differ in the choice of the loss LOUT for the out-distribution where OE uses the cross-entropy loss
between p(xOUTj ) and the uniform distribution and CEDA uses log Conff (x
OUT
j ). Note that both
the CEDA and OE loss attain their global minimum when p(x) is the uniform distribution. Their
difference is typically minor in practice. An important question is the choice of the out-distribution.
For general image classification, it makes sense to use an out-distribution which encompasses basically
any possible image one could ever see at test time and thus the set of all natural images is a good
out-distribution; following [19] we use the 80 Million Tiny Images dataset [37] as a proxy for that.
While OE and CEDA yield state-of-the-art OOD detection performance for image classification tasks
when used together with the 80M Tiny Images dataset as out-distribution, they are, similarly to normal
classifiers, vulnerable to adversarial manipulation of the out-distribution images where the attack is
trying to maximize the confidence in this scenario [28]. Thus [16] proposed Adversarial Confidence
Enhanced Training (ACET) which replaces the CEDA loss with max‖xˆ−xOUTj ‖∞≤ log Conff (xˆ)
and can be seen as adversarial training on the out-distribution for an l∞-threat model. However,
similar to adversarial training on the in-distribution [27] this does not yield any guarantees for out-
distribution detection. In the next section we discuss how to use interval-bound-propagation (IBP) to
get guaranteed OOD detection performance in a l∞-neighborhood of every out-distribution input.
3 Provable guarantees for out-of-distribution detection
Our goal is to minimize the confidence of the classifier not only on the out-distribution images
themselves but in a whole neighborhood around them. For this purpose, we first derive bounds on
the maximal confidence on some l∞-ball around a given point. In certified adversarial robustness
IBP [13] currently leads to the best guarantees for deterministic classifiers under the l∞-threat model.
While other methods for deriving guarantees yield tighter bounds [38, 29], they are not easily scalable
and, when optimized, the bounds given by IBP have been shown to be very tight [13].
IBP. Interval bound propagation [13] provides entrywise lower and upper bounds zk resp. zk
 for
the output zk of the k-th layer of a neural network given that the input x is varied in the l∞-ball of
radius . With z0 = x and z0 = x−  · 1 and z0 = x+  · 1 (1 is the vector of all ones) and Wk
being the weights of the k-th layer (fully connected, convolutional, residual etc.), one gets upper and
lower bounds of the next layers via forward propagation:
zk
 = max(Wk, 0) · zk−1 +min(Wk, 0) · zk−1 + bk
zk = min(Wk, 0) · zk−1 +max(Wk, 0) · zk−1 + bk , (3)
where the min/max expressions are taken componentwise. The activation function (e.g. ReLU)
is directly applied to the bounds. The forward propagation of the bounds is of similar nature as a
standard forward pass and back-propagation w.r.t. the weights is relatively straightforward.
Upper bound on the confidence in terms of the logits. The log confidence of the model at x can
be written as
log Conf(x) = max
k=1,...,K
log
efk(x)∑K
l=1 e
fl(x)
= max
k=1,...,K
− log
K∑
l=1
efl(x)−fk(x). (4)
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We assume that the last layer is affine: f(x) =WL · zL−1(x) + bL, where L is the number of layers
of the network. We calculate the upper bounds of all K2 logit differences as:
max
‖xˆ−x‖∞≤
fk(xˆ)− fl(xˆ) = max‖xˆ−x‖∞≤
WL,k · zL−1(xˆ) + bL,k −WL,l · zL−1(xˆ)− bL,l
= max
‖xˆ−x‖∞≤
(WL,k −WL,l) · zL−1(xˆ) + bL,k − bL,l
≤ max(WL,k −WL,l, 0) · zL−1(x)
+min(WL,k −WL,l, 0) · zL−1(x)

+ bL,k − bL,l
=: fk(x)− fl(x),
(5)
where WL,k denotes the k-th row of WL and bL,k is the k-th component of bL. Note that this upper
bound of the logit difference can be negative and is zero for l = k. Using this upper bound on the
logit difference in Equation (4), we obtain an upper bound on the log confidence:
max
‖xˆ−x‖∞≤
log Conf(xˆ) ≤ max
k=1,...,K
− log
K∑
l=1
e−(fk(x)−fl(x)

) (6)
We use the bound in (6) to evaluate the guarantees on the confidences for given out-distribution
datasets. However, minimizing it directly during training leads to numerical problems, especially at
the beginning of training, when the upper bounds fk(x)− fl(x) are very large for l 6= k , which
makes training numerically infeasible. Instead, we rather upper bound the log confidence again by
bounding the sum inside the negative log from below with K times its lowest term:
max
k=1,...,K
− log
K∑
l=1
e−(fk(x)−fl(x)

) ≤ max
k=1,...,K
− log
(
K · min
l=1,...,K
e−(fk(x)−fl(x)

)
)
= max
k,l=1,...,K
fk(x)− fl(x) − logK
(7)
While this bound can considerably differ from the potentially tighter bound of Equation (6), it is often
quite close as one term in the sum dominates the others. Moreover, both bounds have the same global
minimum when all logits are equal over the l∞-ball. We omit the constant logK in the following as
it does not matter for training.
The direct minimization of the upper bound in (7) is still difficult, in particular for more challenging
in-distribution datasets like SVHN and CIFAR-10, as the bound maxk,l=1,...,K fk(x)− fl(x) can
be several orders of magnitude larger than the in-distribution loss. Therefore, we use the logarithm of
this quantity. However, we also want to have a more fine-grained optimization when the upper bound
becomes small in the later stage of the training. Thus we define the Confidence Upper Bound loss
LCUB for an OOD input as
LCUB(x; ) := log

(
max
k,l=1,...,K
fk(x)− fl(x)
)2
2
+ 1
 . (8)
Note that log(a
2
2 + 1) ≈ a
2
2 for small a and thus we achieve the more fine-grained optimization with
an l2-type of loss in the later stages of training. The overall objective of fully applied Guaranteed
OOD Detection training (GOOD100) is the minimization of
1
N
N∑
i=1
LCE(xINi , yINi ) +
κ
M
M∑
j=1
LCUB(xOUTj ; ) , (9)
where
{
(xINi , y
IN
i ) | 1 ≤ i ≤ N
}
is the in-distribution training set and
{
xOUTj | 1 ≤ j ≤M
}
the out-
distribution. The hyper-parameter κ determines the relative magnitude of the two loss terms. During
training we slowly increase this value and  in order to further stabilize the training with GOOD.
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Quantile-GOOD: trade-off between clean and guaranteed AUC. Training models by minimiz-
ing (9) means that the classifier gets severely punished if any training OOD input receives a high
confidence upper bound. If OOD inputs exist to which the classifier already assigns high confidence
without even considering the worst case, e.g. as these inputs share features with the in-distribution, it
makes little sense to enforce low confidence guarantees. Later in the experiments we show that for
difficult tasks like CIFAR-10 this can happen. In such cases the normal AUC for OOD detection gets
worse as the high loss of the out-distribution part effectively leads to low confidence on a significant
part of the in-distribution which is clearly undesirable.
Hence, for OOD inputs x which are not clearly distinguishable from the in-distribution, it is preferable
to just have the “normal” loss LCUB(xOUTj ; 0) without considering the worst case. We realize this by
enforcing the loss with the guaranteed upper bounds on the confidence just on some quantile of the
easier OOD inputs, namely the ones with the lowest guaranteed out-distribution loss LCUB(x; ). We
first order the OOD training set by the potential loss LCUB(x; ) of each sample in ascending order pi,
that is LCUB(xOUTpi1 ) ≤ LCUB(xOUTpi2 ) ≤ . . . ≤ LCUB(xOUTpiM ). We then apply the loss LCUB(x; ) to the
lower quantile q of the points (the ones with the smallest loss LCUB(x; )) and take LCUB(x; 0) for
the remaining samples, which means no worst-case guarantees on the confidence are enforced:
1
N
N∑
i=1
LCE(xINi , yINi ) +
κ
M
bq·Mc∑
j=1
LCUB(xOUTpij ; ) +
κ
M
M∑
j=bq·Mc+1
LCUB(xOUTpij ; 0) . (10)
During training we do this ordering on the part of each batch consisting of out-distribution images.
On CIFAR-10, where the out-distribution dataset 80M Tiny Images is closer to the in-distribution,
the quantile GOOD-loss allows us to choose the trade-off between clean and guaranteed AUC for
OOD detection, similar to the trade-off between clean and robust accuracy in adversarial robustness.
4 Experiments
We provide experimental results for image recognition tasks with MNIST [22], SVHN [30] and
CIFAR-10 [21] as in-distribution datasets. We first discuss the training details, hyperparameters and
evaluation before we present the results of GOOD and competing methods. Code is available under
https://gitlab.com/Bitterwolf/GOOD.
4.1 Model architectures, training procedure and evaluation
Model architectures and data augmentation. For all experiments, we use deep convolutional
neural networks consisting of convolutional, affine and ReLU layers. For MNIST, we use the large
architecture from [13], and for SVHN and CIFAR-10 a similar but deeper and wider model. The
layer structure is laid out in Table 2 in the appendix. Data augmentation is applied to both in- and
out-distribution images during training. For MNIST we use random crops to size 28×28 with
padding 4 and for SVHN and CIFAR-10 random crops with padding 4 as well as the quite aggressive
augmentation AutoAugment [9]. Additionally, we apply random horizontal flips for CIFAR-10.
GOOD training procedure. As it is the case with IBP training [13] for certified adversarial robust-
ness, we have observed that the inclusion of IBP bounds can make the training unstable or cause it
to fail completely. This can happen for our GOOD training despite the logarithmic damping in the
LCUB loss in (8). Thus, in order to further stabilize the training similar to [13], we use linear ramp up
schedules for  and κ, which are detailed in Appendix D. As radii for the l∞-perturbation model on
the out-distribution we use  = 0.3 for MNIST and  = 0.01 for SVHN and CIFAR-10 (note that
0.01 > 2255 ≈ 0.0078). The chosen  = 0.01 for SVHN/CIFAR-10 is so small that the chanages are
hardly visible (see Figure ??). As parameter κ for the trade-off between cross-entropy loss and the
GOOD regularizer in (9) and (10), we set κ = 0.3 for MNIST and κ = 1 for SVHN and CIFAR-10.
In order to explore the potential trade-off between the separation of in- and out-distribution for
clean and perturbed out-distribution inputs (clean AUCs vs guaranteed AUCs - see below), we train
GOOD models for different quantiles q ∈ [0, 1] in (10) which we denote as GOODQ in the following.
Here, Q = 100q is the percentage of out-distribution training samples for which we minimize the
guaranteed upper bounds on the confidence of the neural network in the l∞-ball of radius  around
the out-distribution point during training. Note that GOOD100 corresponds to (9) where we minimize
the guaranteed upper bound on the worst-case confidence for all out-distribution samples, whereas
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GOOD0 can be seen as a variant of OE or CEDA. A training batch consists of 128 in- and 128
out-distribution samples. Examples of OOD training batches with the employed augmentation and
their quantile splits for a GOOD60 model are shown in Table 3 in the appendix.
For the training out-distribution, we use 80 Million Tiny Images (80M) [37], which is a large collection
of natural images associated to nouns in wordnet [11]. All methods get the same out-distribution for
training and we are neither training nor adapting hyperparameters for each OOD dataset separately
as in some previous work. Since CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 are subsets of 80M, we follow [19]
and filter them out. Even after the filtering process we have observed that the remaining dataset still
contains images from the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 classes. Thus we have further excluded all
samples for which a CIFAR-10 CEDA model has confidence above 11%, altogether removing 4.25M
images. As can be seen in the example batches in Table 3, even this reduced dataset contains still
images from CIFAR-10 classes, which explains why our quantile-based loss is essential to get good
performance on CIFAR-10. We take a subset of 50 million images as OOD training set. Since the
size of the training set of the in-distribution datasets (MNIST: 60,000; SVHN: 73,257; CIFAR-10:
50000) is small compared to 50 million, typically an OOD image appears only once during training.
Evaluation. For each method, we compute the test accuracy on the in-distribution task, and for
various out-distribution datasets (not seen during training) we report the area under the receiver
operating characteristic curve (AUC) as a measure for the separation of in- from out-distribution
samples based on the predicted confidences on the test sets. As OOD evaluation sets we use
FashionMNIST [39], the Letters of EMNIST [5], grayscale CIFAR-10, and Uniform Noise for
MNIST, and CIFAR-100 [21], CIFAR-10/SVHN, LSUN Classroom [40], and Uniform Noise for
SVHN/CIFAR-10. Further evaluation on other OOD datasets can be found in Appendix H.
We are particularly interested in the worst case OOD detection performance of all methods under the
l∞-perturbation model for the out-distribution. For this purpose, we compute the adversarial AUC
(AAUC) and the guaranteed AUC (GAUC). These AUCs are based on the maximal confidence in
the l∞-ball of radius  around each out-distribution image. For the adversarial AUC, we compute
a lower bound on the maximal confidence in the l∞-ball by using Auto-PGD [8] for maximizing
the confidence of the classifier inside the intersection of the l∞- ball and the image domain [0, 1]d.
Auto-PGD uses an automatic stepsize selection scheme and has been shown to outperform PGD. We
use an adaptation to our setting (described in Appendix A) with 500 steps and 5 restarts on 1000
points from each test set. On MNIST, gradient masking poses a significant challenge so we use
an additional attack discussed in Appendix A and report the worst case. For the guaranteed AUC,
we compute an upper bound on the confidence in the intersection of the l∞- ball with the image
domain [0, 1]d via IBP using (6) for the full test set. These worst case/guaranteed confidences for the
out-distributions are then used for the AUC computation.
Competitors. We compare a normally trained model (Plain), the state-of-the-art OOD detection
method Outlier Exposure (OE) [19], CEDA [16] and Adversarial Confidence Enhanced Training
(ACET) [16], which we adjusted to the given task as described in the appendix. As CEDA performs
very similar to OE, we omit it in the figures for better readability. The -radii for the l∞-balls are the
same for ACET and GOOD. So far the only method which could provide robustness guarantees for
OOD detection is Certified Certain Uncertainty (CCU) with a data-dependent Mahalanobis-type l2
threat model. We use their publicly available code to train a CCU model with our architecture and we
evaluate their guarantees for our l∞ threat model. In Appendix B, we provide details and explain
why their guarantees turn out to be vacuous in our setting.
4.2 Results
In Table 1 we present the results on all datasets.
GOOD is provably better than OE/CEDA with regard to worst case OOD detection. We note
that for almost all OOD datasets GOOD achieves non-trivial GAUCs. Thus the guarantees generalize
from the training out-distribution 80M to the test OOD datasets. For the easier in-distributions
MNIST and SVHN, which are more clearly separated from the out-distribution, the best results are
achieved for GOOD100 whereas for CIFAR-10 the best guarantees are given by GOOD90 or GOOD95.
However, if taking clean AUCs into account, arguably the best trade-off is achieved for GOOD80.
Note that the guaranteed AUC (GAUC) of these models is always better than the adversarial AUC
(AAUC) of OE/CEDA (except for EMNIST). Thus it is fair to say that the worst-case OOD detection
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Table 1: Accuracies as well as AUC, adversarial AUC (AAUC) and guaranteed AUC (GAUC) values
for the MNIST, SVHN and CIFAR-10 in-distributions with respect to several unseen out-distributions.
GOOD is the only method with non-zero GAUC which for GOOD100 on MNIST/SVHN and GOOD80
on CIFAR-10 on almost all OOD datsets (except EMNIST) is better than the AAUC of OE and
CEDA. Thus GOOD is provably better than OE and CEDA w.r.t. worst-case OOD detection. GOOD
achieves this without significant loss in accuracy. Especially on SVHN, GOOD100 has very good
accuracy and almost perfect provable worst-case OOD detection performance.
AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC
PLAIN 99.5 97.7 1.3 0.0 87.9 0.5 0.0 98.5 0.1 0.0 99.4 0.0 0.0
CEDA 99.5 100.0 78.4 0.0 92.8 17.9 0.0 100.0 86.4 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
OE 99.5 99.9 69.7 0.0 92.8 13.5 0.0 100.0 93.2 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
ACET 99.5 100.0 99.5 0.0 96.4 62.6 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
CCU 99.5 100.0 76.6 0.0 92.9 3.1 0.0 100.0 98.9 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
GOOD0 99.5 99.9 78.6 0.0 92.8 15.7 0.0 100.0 98.6 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
GOOD20 99.2 99.8 88.0 9.6 95.2 47.4 0.0 100.0 100.0 26.7 100.0 100.0 100.0
GOOD40 99.1 99.8 94.4 28.7 95.7 58.1 0.0 100.0 100.0 65.2 100.0 100.0 100.0
GOOD60 98.9 99.9 95.2 43.3 96.6 64.6 0.2 100.0 100.0 85.2 100.0 100.0 100.0
GOOD80 99.0 99.9 96.1 57.0 97.8 69.4 4.2 100.0 100.0 95.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
GOOD90 98.9 99.9 96.4 67.4 98.2 69.6 6.1 100.0 100.0 97.8 100.0 100.0 100.0
GOOD95 98.8 99.9 96.3 73.1 98.6 66.0 4.7 100.0 100.0 98.8 100.0 100.0 100.0
GOOD100 98.7 100.0 97.1 79.2 98.9 59.4 3.3 100.0 100.0 99.4 100.0 100.0 100.0
IN: SVHN  = 0.01
METHOD ACC. CIFAR-100 CIFAR-10 LSUN CLASSROOM UNIFORM NOISE
AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC
PLAIN 95.5 94.9 57.1 0.0 95.2 59.3 0.0 95.7 69.2 0.0 99.4 91.4 0.0
CEDA 95.4 99.9 98.7 0.0 99.9 97.3 0.0 100.0 99.7 0.0 100.0 99.9 0.0
OE 95.5 100.0 98.2 0.0 100.0 98.1 0.0 100.0 99.7 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
ACET 95.6 100.0 99.8 0.0 100.0 99.9 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 99.7 96.8 0.0
CCU 95.7 100.0 98.0 0.0 100.0 97.8 0.0 100.0 99.7 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
GOOD0 97.0 100.0 97.4 0.0 100.0 97.6 0.0 100.0 99.8 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
GOOD20 96.5 99.9 99.3 19.1 99.9 99.4 17.9 99.9 99.9 23.6 99.9 100.0 99.9
GOOD40 96.1 99.9 99.3 43.2 100.0 99.4 48.1 100.0 99.9 60.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
GOOD60 95.8 99.9 99.5 64.8 100.0 99.6 71.0 100.0 99.9 85.0 100.0 100.0 99.9
GOOD80 95.9 99.6 99.4 87.6 99.6 99.4 91.2 99.6 99.6 97.5 99.6 99.6 98.7
GOOD90 96.3 99.9 99.7 95.8 99.9 99.8 97.7 100.0 100.0 99.7 100.0 99.9 99.3
GOOD95 96.2 99.8 99.6 97.8 99.8 99.7 98.9 99.8 99.8 99.7 99.8 99.8 99.6
GOOD100 96.6 99.9 99.7 99.4 100.0 99.9 99.7 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 99.9
IN: CIFAR-10  = 0.01
METHOD ACC. CIFAR-100 SVHN LSUN CLASSROOM UNIFORM NOISE
AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC
PLAIN 90.1 84.3 6.3 0.0 87.7 10.1 0.0 88.9 9.8 0.0 90.6 56.8 0.0
CEDA 87.6 90.9 35.0 0.0 97.6 42.4 0.0 98.0 47.1 0.0 97.8 81.9 0.0
OE 90.5 92.2 20.3 0.0 98.1 17.7 0.0 98.9 38.9 0.0 97.4 72.6 0.0
ACET 89.1 90.5 76.1 0.0 96.9 91.0 0.0 98.5 91.7 0.0 97.8 96.3 0.0
CCU 91.6 93.0 23.3 0.0 97.1 14.8 0.0 99.3 38.2 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
GOOD0 89.6 93.0 28.2 0.0 97.7 35.5 0.0 98.1 67.5 0.0 97.7 95.1 0.0
GOOD20 86.4 88.3 45.8 9.4 94.3 51.3 19.5 97.6 65.4 1.7 94.8 92.2 90.9
GOOD40 89.6 89.6 62.1 25.3 96.1 89.1 25.1 96.4 92.1 28.8 93.2 91.7 91.4
GOOD60 89.8 88.7 63.2 34.8 95.8 80.3 28.5 96.5 90.6 53.2 91.5 90.3 89.7
GOOD80 90.0 85.9 67.3 46.3 95.6 84.8 41.0 96.2 90.7 61.9 90.5 87.5 87.0
GOOD90 90.2 81.8 64.2 51.6 91.0 76.4 53.3 94.5 85.7 61.5 93.8 92.4 91.9
GOOD95 90.3 77.5 60.0 52.0 89.6 71.2 47.9 84.6 66.0 57.5 98.4 98.1 98.0
GOOD100 90.3 73.9 45.7 30.0 74.3 30.3 4.7 82.7 63.4 54.2 99.1 98.7 98.6
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Plain
OE
CCU
ACET
   GOOD100
4:   99.4 
4:   95.5 
4:   96.6 
4:   92.3 
2:   10.0 
8:   100.0 
8:   100.0 
8:   100.0 
8:   98.5 
3:   21.8 
0:   100.0 
0:   99.7 
0:   99.9 
0:   94.2 
0:   22.7 
0:   45.2 
4:   72.5 
4:   70.9 
4:   35.0 
6:   14.7 
8:   65.9 
8:   65.8 
8:   56.3 
8:   58.6 
2:   10.0 
4:   51.6 
4:   48.6 
4:   67.3 
7:   58.1 
7:   16.6 
9:   99.9 
9:   99.9 
9:   100.0 
9:   96.1 
9:   12.8 
4:   100.0 
4:   100.0 
4:   100.0 
4:   99.8 
2:   10.0 
1:   100.0 
1:   99.9 
1:   100.0 
1:   99.8 
1:   80.8 
5:   99.9 
5:   99.8 
5:   99.2 
5:   68.7 
5:   25.3 
Figure 2: Random samples from 10 letters in the out-distribution dataset EMNIST. The predictions
and confidences of all methods trained on MNIST are shown on top. GOOD100 is the only method
which is not overconfident (e.g. “H”) unless the letter is indistinguishable from a digit (“I”).
performance of GOOD is provably better than that of OE/CEDA. As expected, ACET yields good
AAUCs but has no guarantees. The failure of CCU regarding guarantees is discussed in Appendix B.
It is notable that GOOD100 has basically perfect guaranteed OOD detection performance for MNIST
on CIFAR-10/uniform noise and for SVHN on all out-distribution datasets. In Appendix I we show
that the guarantees of GOOD partially hold even at larger radii than used during training.
GOOD achieves certified OOD performance with almost no loss in accuracy. While there is a
small drop in clean accuracy for MNIST, on SVHN, GOOD100 has with 96.6% a better clean accuracy
than all competing methods. On CIFAR-10 GOOD80 achieves an accuracy of 90.0% which is better
than ACET and only slightly worse than Plain and OE. This is remarkable as we are not aware of
any model with certified adversarial robustness on the in-distribution which gets even close to this
range; e.g. IBP [13] achieves an accuracy of 85.2% on SVHN with  = 0.01 (we have 96.6%), on
CIFAR-10 with  = 2255 they get 71.2% (we have 90.0%). Previous certified methods had even worse
clean accuracy. Since a significant loss in prediction performance is usually not acceptable, certified
methods have not yet had much practical impact. Thus we think it is an encouraging and interesting
observation that properties different from adversarial robustness like worst-case out-of-distribution
detection can be certified without suffering much in accuracy. In particular, it is quite surprising that
certified methods can be trained effectively with aggressive data augmentation like AutoAugment.
Trade-off between clean and guaranteed AUC via Quantile-GOOD. As discussed above, even
after filtering, our training out-distribution contains in-distribution images from CIFAR-10 classes.
This seems to be the reason why GOOD100 suffers from a significant drop in clean and guaranteed
AUC, as the only way to ensure small loss LCUB, if in- and out-distribution can partially not be
distinguished, is to reduce also the confidence on the in-distribution. This conflict is then resolved via
GOOD80 and GOOD90 which both have better clean and guaranteed AUCs. It is an interesting open
question if similar trade-offs are potentially also useful for certified adversarial robustness.
EMNIST: distinguishing letters from digits without ever having seen letters. GOOD100 achieves
an excellent AUC of 98.9% for the letters of EMNIST which is, up to our knowledge, state-of-the-art.
Indeed, an AUC of 100% should not be expected as even for humans some letters like i and l are
indistinguishable from digits. This result is quite remarkable as GOOD100 has never seen letters
during training. Moreover, as the AUC just distinguishes the separation of in-and out-distribution
based on the confidence, we provide the mean confidence on all datasets in the Appendix in Table 4
and in Figure 2 (see also Figure 3 in the Appendix) we show some samples from EMNIST together
with their prediction/confidences for all models. GOOD100 has a mean confidence of 98.3% on
MNIST but only 27.8% on EMNIST in contrast to ACET with 71.3%, OE 87.7% and Plain 91.3%.
This shows that while the AUC’s of ACET and OE are good for EMNIST, these methods are still
highly overconfident on EMNIST. Only GOOD100 produces meaningful higher confidences on
EMNIST, when the letter has clear features of the corresponding digit.
5 Conclusion
We propose GOOD, a novel training method to achieve guaranteed OOD detection in a worst-case
setting. GOOD provably outperforms OE, the state-of-the-art in OOD detection, in worst case OOD
detection and has state-of-the-art performance on EMNIST which is a particularly challenging out-
distribution dataset. As the test accuracy of GOOD is comparable to the one of normal training, this
shows that certified methods have the potential to be useful in practice even for more complex tasks.
In future work it will be interesting to explore how close certified methods can get to state-of-the-art
test performance.
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Broader Impact
In order to use machine learning in safety-critical systems it is required that the machine learning
system correctly flags its uncertainty. As neural networks have been shown to be overconfident
far away from the training data, this work aims at overcoming this issue by not only enforcing
low confidence on out-distribution images but even guaranteeing low confidence in a neighborhood
around it. As a neural network should not flag that it knows when it does not know, we see only
positive implications of this work for our society.
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APPENDIX
A Adversarial attacks on OOD detection
It has been demonstrated [2, 36, 4, 7] that without strong countermeasures, DNNs are very susceptible to
adversarial attacks changing the classification result. The goal of adversarial attacks in our setting is to fool the
OOD detection which is based on the confidence in the prediction. Thus the attacker aims at maximizing the
confidence in a neighborhood around a given out-distribution input x so that the adversarially modified image
will be wrongly assigned to the in-distribution. In this paper, we regard as threat model/neighborhood an l∞-ball
of a given radius , that is {z ∈ [0, 1]d | ‖z − x‖∞ ≤ }; note that in our case the disturbed inputs have to be
valid images, hence the additional constraint z ∈ [0, 1]d.
For evaluation, we use Auto-PGD [8], which is a state-of-the-art implementation of PGD (projected gradient
descent), with backtracking, adaptive step sizes and random restarts. Since Auto-PGD has been designed for
finding adversarial samples around the in-distribution, we change the objective of Auto-PGD to be the confidence
of the classifier. We use Auto-PGD with 500 steps and 5 random restarts which is a quite strong attack. By
default, the random initialization is drawn uniformly from the -ball. However, we found that for MNIST the
attack very often got stuck for our GOOD models, because a large random perturbation of size 0.3 would move
the sample directly into a region of the input space where the model is completely flat and thus no gradients are
available (in this sense adversarial attacks on OOD inputs are more difficult than usual adversarial attacks on the
in-distribution). We instead use a modified version of the attack for MNIST which starts within short distance of
the original point. Thus we use as initialization a random perturbation from [−0.01, 0.01]d (note that for our
evaluation on SVHN and CIFAR10, this choice coincides with the default settings).
Nevertheless, for MNIST most out-distribution points lie in regions where the predictions of our GOOD models
are flat, i.e. the gradients are exactly zero. Because of this, Auto-PGD is unable to effectively explore the search
space around those points. Thus, for MNIST we created an adaptive attack which partially circumvents these
issues. First, we use an initialization scheme that mitigates lack of gradients by increasing the contrast as much
as the threat model allows. All pixel values xi that lie above 1−  get set to xi = 1 and all values xi ≤ 1− 
get set to max{0, xi − }. In our experience these points are more likely to yield gradients, so we use them as
initialization for a 200-step PGD attack with backtracking, adaptive step size selection and momentum of 0.9.
Concretely, we use a step size of 0.1, and whenever a PGD step does not increase the confidence we backtrack
and halve the step size. After every successful gradient step we multiply the step size by 1.1. Using backtracking
and adaptive step size is necessary because otherwise one can easily step into regions where gradient information
is no longer available. Additionally, to further mitigate the problem of gradient-masking at initialization, we
use the adversarial images that Auto-PGD finds for models without significant gradient masking (Plain, OE,
GOOD0) as initialization for the same monotone PGD for models which show significant gradient masking
(CEDA, ACET).
B A review of robust OOD detection
ACET A method that was proposed in order to achieve adversarially robust low confidence on OOD data
is Adversarial Confidence Enhancing Training (ACET) [16] which is based on adversarial training on the
out-distribution. However, similar to adversarial training on the in-distribution, this does typically not lead to
any guarantees, whereas our goal is to get guarantees on the confidences of worst-case out-distribution inputs.
ACET has the following objective:
1
N
N∑
i=1
LCE(xINi , yINi ) + κ
M
M∑
j=1
max
‖xˆ−xOUTj ‖∞≤
LOUT(xˆ) . (11)
They use LOUT = logConff with low frequency noise as their training out-distribution. We found firstly that
training an ACET model with 80M as out-distribution yields much better results than the smoothed uniform
noise used in [16] and secondly using the cross-entropy loss with respect to the uniform prediction instead of
log Conff also leads to improvements. For training ACET models, we employ a standard PGD attack with
40 steps of size 2
41
with initialization at the target input for maximizing the loss around xOUTj . As usual for a
l∞-attack, we use the sign of the gradient as direction and project onto the intersection of the image domain
[0, 1]d and the l∞-ball of radius  around the target. Finally, the attack returns the image with the highest
confidence found during the iterations. For the attack at training time we use no backtracking or adaptive
stepsizes. ACET does not provide any guaranteed confidence bounds.
CCU Certified Certain Uncertainty (CCU) [28] gives low confidence guarantees around certain OOD data
that is far away from the training dataset in a specific metric. Those bounds do hold on such far-away datasets,
but do not generalize to inputs relatively close to the in distribution, like for example CIFAR-10 vs. CIFAR-
100. Moreover, even in the regime where CCU yields meaningful guarantees, they are given in terms of a
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data-dependent Mahalanobis distance rather than the l∞-distance. However, due to norm equivalences, one can
still extract l∞-guarantees from CCU and we evaluated the CCU guarantees as follows. We use the corollary 3.1
from [28] which states that for a CCU model that is written as
p(y|x) = p(y|x, i)p(x|i) +
1
K
p(x|o)
p(x|i) + p(x|o) (12)
with p(y|x, i) being the softmax output of a neural network and p(x|i) and p(x|o) Gaussian mixture models for
in-and out-distribution, one can bound the confidence in a certain neighborhood around any point x ∈ Rd via
max
dM (xˆ,x)≤R
p(y|x) ≤ 1
K
1 +K b(x,R)
1 + b(x,R)
. (13)
Here b : Rd × R+ → R+ is a positive function that increases monotonically in the radius R and that depends
on the parameters of the Gaussian mixture models (details in [28]). The metric dM : Rd × Rd → R+ that they
used for their CCU model is given as
dM (x, y) =
∥∥∥C− 12 (x− y)∥∥∥ , (14)
where C is a regularized version of the covariance matrix, calculated on the augmented in-distribution data.
Note that this Mahalanobis metric is strongly equivalent to the metric induced by the l2-norm and consequently
to the metric induced by the l∞-norm. By computing the equivalence constants between these metrics we can
extract the l∞-guarantees that are implicit in the CCU model. Geometrically speaking, we compute the size a an
ellipsoid (its shape determined by the eigenvalues of C) that is large enough to fit a cube inside it with a radius
given by our threat model r = 0.3 or r = 0.01, respectively. Via norm equivalences one has
dM (x, y) ≤
√
λ1d2(x, y) ≤
√
dλ1d∞(x, y) ≤
√
dλ1r, (15)
where λ1 is the largest eigenvalue ofC. This means that the confidence upper bounds from (13) on a Mahalanobis-
ball of radius R = (dλ)
1
2 r automatically apply to an l∞-ball of radius r. However, the covariance matrix C is
highly ill-conditioned, which means that λ1 is fairly high. On top of that, in high dimensions
√
d is big as well
so that in practice the required radius R becomes too large for CCU to certify meaningful guarantees. Even on
uniform noise, the upper bounds were larger than the highest confidence on the in-distribution test set, with the
consequence that there are no lower-bounds on the AAUC. However, we want to stress that at least for uniform
noise the lack of guarantees of CCU is due to the incompatability of the threat models used in our paper and [28].
Another type of guarantee that certifies a detection rate for OOD samples by applying probably approximately
correct (PAC) learning considerations has been proposed in [26]. Their problem setting and nature of guarantees
are not directly comparable to ours, since their guarantees handle behaviour on whole distributions while our
guarantees are given for individual datapoints.
C AUC and Conservative AUC
As a measure for the separation of in- vs. out-distribution data we use the Area Under the Receiver Operating
Characteristic curve (AUROC or AUC) using the confidence of the classifier as the feature. The AUC is equal to
the empirical probability of a random in-sample to be assigned a higher confidence than a random out-sample,
plus one half times the probability of the confidences being equal. Thus, the standard way (as e.g. implemented
in scikit-learn [32]) to calculate the AUC from given confidence values on sets of in- and out-distribution samples
Sin and Sout is
AUC(f, Sin, Sout) =
1
|Sin||Sout|
(
|{xin ∈ Sin, xout ∈ Sout | Conff (xin) > Conff (xout)}|
+
1
2
|{xin ∈ Sin, xout ∈ Sout | Conff (xin) = Conff (xout)}|
)
,
(16)
where for a set S, |S| indicates the number of its elements. The half-weighted equality term gives this definition
certain symmetry properties. However, it assigns a positive score to some completely uninformed functions f .
For example, a constant uniform classifier with pk(x) = 1K receives an AUC value of 50%. Similarly, a classifier
that assigns 100% confidence to most in-distribution inputs would have positive AUC and even GAUC statistics,
even if it fails to have confidence below 100% on any OOD inputs. In order to regard only example pairs
where the distributions are positively distinguished, we define the Conservative AUC (cAUC) by dropping the
equality term:
cAUC(f, Sin, Sout) :=
1
|Sin||Sout| |{xin ∈ Sin, xout ∈ Sout | Conff (xin) > Conff (xout)}| . (17)
While in general cAUC(f, Sin, Sout) ≤ AUC(f, Sin, Sout), the confidences of all models presented in the
paper are differentiated enough so that for all shown numbers actually cAUC = AUC. However, we have
experienced that one can have models where the confidences (uniform or one-hot predictions) cannot be
distinguished due to limited numerical precision. In these cases the normal AUC definition would indicate a
certain discrimination where it is actually impossible to discriminate the confidences.
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D Experimental details
The layer compositions of the architectures used for all GOOD and baseline models are laid out in Table 2. No
normalization of inputs or activations is used. Weight decay (l2) is set to 0.05 for MNIST and 0.005 for SVHN
and CIFAR-10. For all runs, we use a batch size of 128 samples from both the in- and the out-distribution (where
applicable). At https://gitlab.com/Bitterwolf/GOOD you can find the exact implementation.
Table 2: Model architectures used for MNIST (L), SVHN (XL) and CIFAR-10 (XL) experiments.
Each convolutional and non-final affine layer is followed by a ReLU activation. All convolutions use
a kernel size of 3, a padding of 1, and stride of 1, except for the third convolution which has stride=2.
L XL
CONV2D(64) CONV2D(128)
CONV2D(64) CONV2D(128)
CONV2D(128)S=2 CONV2D(256)S=2
CONV2D(128) CONV2D(256)
CONV2D(128) CONV2D(256)
LINEAR(512) LINEAR(512)
LINEAR(10) LINEAR(512)
LINEAR(10)
For the MNIST experiments, we use as optimizer SGD with 0.9 Nesterov momentum, with an initial learning
rate of 0.005
128
that is divided by 5 after 50, 100, 200, 300 and 350 epochs, with a total number of 420 training
epochs. For the GOOD, CEDA and OE runs, the first two epochs only use in-distribution LCE; over the next
100 epochs, the value of κ is ramped up linearly from zero to its final value of 0.3 for GOOD/OE and 1.0 for
CEDA, where it stays for the remaining 318 epochs. The  value in the LCUB loss for GOOD is also increased
linearly, starting at epoch 10 and reaching its final value of 0.3 on epoch 130. CCU is trained using the publicly
available code from [28], where we modify the architecture, learning rate schedule and data augmentation to be
the same as OE. The initial learning rate for the Gaussian mixture models is 1e− 5/batchsize and gets dropped
at the same epochs as the neural network learning rate. Our more aggressive data augmentation implies that our
underlying Mahalanobis metric is not the same as they used in [28]. The ACET model for MNIST is warmed
up with two epochs on the in-distribution only, then four with κ = 1.0 and  = 0, and the full ACET loss with
κ = 1.0 and  = 0.3 for the remaining epochs. The reason why we chose a smaller κ of 0.3 for the MNIST
GOOD runs is that considering the large  for which guarantees are enforced, training with higher κ values
makes training unstable without improving any validation results.
For the SVHN and CIFAR-10 baseline models, we used the ADAM optimizer [20] with initial learning rate
0.01
128
for SVHN and 0.1
128
for CIFAR-10 that was divided by 5 after 30 and 100 epochs, with a total number
of 420 training epochs. For OE, κ is increased linearly from zero to one between epochs 60 and 360. The
same holds for CCU which again uses the same hyperparameters as OE. Again, ACET is warmed up with two
in-distribution-only and four OE epochs. Then it is trained with κ = 1.0 and  = 0.01, with a shorter training
time of 100 epochs (the same number as used in [16]).
In line with the experiences reported in [13] and [41], for GOOD training on SVHN and CIFAR-10 longer
training schedules with slower ramping up of the LCUB loss are necessary, as adding the out-distribution loss
defined in Equation (8) to the training objective at once will overwhelm the in-distribution cross-entropy loss and
cause the model to collapse to uniform predictions for all inputs, without recovery. In order to reduce warm-up
time, we use a pre-trained CEDA model for initialization and train for 900 epochs. The learning rate is 10-4 in
the beginning and is divided by 5 after epochs 450, 750 and 850. Due to the pre-training, we begin training with
a small κ and already start with non-zero  after epoch 4. Then,  is increased linearly to its final value of 0.01
which is reached at epoch 204. Simultaneously, κ is increased linearly with a virtual starting point at epoch -2 to
its final value of 1.0 at epoch 298.
Due to the tendency of IBP based training towards instabilities, the selection of hyper-parameters was based on
finding settings where training is reliably stable while guaranteed bounds over meaningful  radii are possible.
For the accuracy, AUC and GAUC evaluations in Table 1 the test splits of each (non-noise) dataset were
used, with the following numbers of samples: 10,000 for MNIST, FashionMNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100
and Uniform Noise; 20,800 for EMNIST Letters; 26,032 for SVHN; 300 for LSUN Classroom. Due to the
computational cost of the employed attacks, the AAUC values are based on subsets of 1000 samples for each
dataset.
All experiments were run on Nvidia Tesla P100 and V100 GPUs, with GPU memory requirement below 16GB.
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E Depiction of GOOD Quantile-loss
In Quantile-GOOD training, the out-distribution part of each batch is split up into “harder” and “easier” parts,
since trying to enforce low confidence guarantees on inputs that are very close to the in-distribution leads to low
confidences in general, even on the in-distribution. In Table 3, we show example batches of GOOD60 models
with MNIST, SVHN and CIFAR-10 as in-distribution near the end of training (from epochs 410, 890 and 890,
respectively). Even though many CIFAR-like images were filtered out, some are still present. For the CIFAR-10
model, such samples (among others) get sorted above the quantile. For MNIST, lower brightness images appear
to be more difficult, while for SVHN images with fewer objects seem to be comparably hardest to distinguish
from the house numbers of the in-distribution.
Table 3: Exemplary batch of out-distribution 80M Tiny Images (after augmentation) towards the end
of training of GOOD60 models. Top: The 52 Images with highest confidence upper bound. On these,
loss is based on standard output. Bottom: The remaining 76 Images with lowest confidence upper
bound. Here, loss is based on upper bounds within the -ball.
IN: MNIST IN: SVHN IN: CIFAR-10
F Confidences on EMNIST
Figure 3 shows samples of the letters “k” to “z” together with the predictions and confidences of the GOOD100
MNIST model and four baseline models, complementing Figure 2. Also on these samples we see that GOOD100
only produces high confidences for letters when they show digit-specific features (“l”, “q”, “s”). All other
methods including ACET also produce high confidences for letters which are quite distinct from digits (“m”,
“n”, “p”, “y”).
The mean confidence values of the same selection of MNIST models for each letter of the alphabet for EMNIST
are plotted in Figure 4. We observe that the mean confidence is mostly aligned with the intuitive likeness of a
letter with some digit: GOOD100 has the highest mean confidence on the letter inputs “i” and “l”, which in many
cases do look like the digit “1”. Curiously, the confidence of GOOD100 on the letter “o”, which even humans
often cannot distinguish from a digit “0”, is generally low.
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Figure 3: Continuation of Figure 2. Random samples from the remaining letters in the out-distribution
dataset EMNIST. The predictions and confidences of different methods trained on MNIST are shown
on top.
Figure 4: Mean confidence of different models across the classes of EMNIST-Letters. GOOD100
only has high mean confidence on letters that can easily be mistaken for digits.
G Distributions of confidences and confidence upper bounds
Table 4 shows the mean confidences of all models on the in-distribution as well as the mean confidences and the
mean guaranteed upper bounds on the worst-case confidences on the evaluated out-distributions. As discussed,
GOOD100 training can reduce the confidence on the in-distribution, with a particularly strong effect for CIFAR-10.
By adjusting the loss quantile, this effect can be significantly reduced while maintaining non-trivial guarantees.
The histograms of mean confidences on the in-distribution and mean guaranteed upper bounds on the worst-
case confidences on the samples from the evaluated out-distribution test sets for seven models are shown in
Tables 5 (MNIST), 6 (SVHN) and 7 (CIFAR-10). A higher GOOD loss quantile generally shifts the distribution
of the upper bounds on the worst-case confidence towards smaller values, but in some cases, especially for
GOOD100 on CIFAR-10, strongly lowers confidences in in-distribution predictions as well.
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Table 4: Mean confidence on the in-distribution and mean confidence / mean upper bounds on the
confidence within the l∞-balls of radius  on the evaluated out-distribution datasets.
IN: MNIST  = 0.3
METHOD MNIST FASHIONMNIST EMNIST
LETTERS
CIFAR-10 UNIFORM NOISE
PLAIN 99.7 80.3 / 100.0 91.3 / 100.0 79.3 / 100.0 73.4 / 100.0
CEDA 99.7 17.3 / 100.0 87.6 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0
OE 99.7 24.3 / 100.0 87.7 / 100.0 10.1 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0
ACET 99.4 11.0 / 100.0 71.5 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0
CCU 99.7 17.5 / 100.0 87.4 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0
GOOD0 99.7 20.6 / 100.0 87.8 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0
GOOD20 99.5 19.8 / 93.2 69.7 / 100.0 10.0 / 78.1 10.0 / 10.0
GOOD40 99.3 19.2 / 77.4 58.7 / 100.0 10.0 / 43.9 10.0 / 10.0
GOOD60 99.2 15.7 / 64.6 49.4 / 99.9 10.0 / 24.9 10.0 / 10.0
GOOD80 99.1 15.4 / 54.1 40.3 / 98.4 10.0 / 15.3 10.0 / 10.0
GOOD90 98.8 15.5 / 47.3 36.1 / 97.8 10.0 / 12.7 10.0 / 10.0
GOOD95 98.8 12.7 / 42.9 32.6 / 98.6 10.0 / 11.7 10.0 / 10.0
GOOD100 98.3 11.1 / 39.5 27.8 / 99.2 10.0 / 11.0 10.0 / 10.0
IN: SVHN  = 0.01
METHOD SVHN CIFAR-100 CIFAR-10 LSUN
CLASSROOM
UNIFORM NOISE
PLAIN 97.7 70.8 / 100.0 70.5 / 100.0 66.8 / 100.0 40.5 / 100.0
CEDA 97.4 10.3 / 100.0 10.2 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0
OE 97.2 10.9 / 100.0 10.6 / 100.0 10.3 / 100.0 10.2 / 100.0
ACET 95.5 10.2 / 100.0 10.1 / 100.0 10.1 / 100.0 15.1 / 100.0
CCU 97.2 10.8 / 100.0 10.6 / 100.0 10.4 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0
GOOD0 98.7 10.0 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0
GOOD20 97.9 10.1 / 83.0 10.1 / 84.0 10.0 / 79.0 10.0 / 10.0
GOOD40 97.7 10.1 / 61.5 10.1 / 57.1 10.0 / 46.6 10.0 / 10.0
GOOD60 97.4 10.1 / 42.3 10.1 / 36.6 10.0 / 23.8 10.0 / 10.2
GOOD80 97.4 10.1 / 25.9 10.1 / 21.5 10.0 / 13.5 10.0 / 13.6
GOOD90 97.2 10.1 / 17.6 10.0 / 14.9 10.0 / 10.9 10.0 / 11.6
GOOD95 96.9 10.1 / 14.9 10.0 / 13.1 10.0 / 10.4 10.0 / 11.0
GOOD100 95.7 10.2 / 12.6 10.0 / 11.5 10.0 / 10.3 10.0 / 10.0
IN: CIFAR-10  = 0.01
METHOD CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 SVHN LSUN
CLASSROOM
UNIFORM NOISE
PLAIN 95.1 79.0 / 100.0 75.8 / 100.0 73.9 / 100.0 73.2 / 100.0
CEDA 85.5 28.6 / 100.0 12.3 / 100.0 10.4 / 100.0 10.9 / 100.0
OE 86.9 31.7 / 100.0 16.1 / 100.0 13.7 / 100.0 18.0 / 100.0
ACET 75.1 25.9 / 100.0 16.1 / 100.0 13.3 / 100.0 15.1 / 100.0
CCU 89.4 32.5 / 100.0 20.5 / 100.0 12.6 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0
GOOD0 80.7 18.7 / 100.0 10.7 / 100.0 10.1 / 100.0 10.0 / 100.0
GOOD20 78.4 27.0 / 92.5 14.1 / 84.8 11.2 / 98.7 11.0 / 13.0
GOOD40 81.0 25.1 / 85.3 11.1 / 85.6 10.6 / 90.6 11.7 / 12.3
GOOD60 71.9 21.4 / 75.8 11.5 / 80.9 10.8 / 62.5 13.1 / 13.6
GOOD80 62.8 21.9 / 63.7 11.8 / 66.2 11.3 / 45.4 15.0 / 15.3
GOOD90 56.4 24.2 / 54.1 15.0 / 52.0 12.9 / 41.4 13.5 / 13.6
GOOD95 45.7 26.1 / 44.4 17.6 / 47.5 21.2 / 40.1 11.5 / 11.5
GOOD100 28.7 24.4 / 28.3 25.2 / 31.0 22.7 / 26.7 13.9 / 14.0
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Table 5: Histograms of the confidences on the MNIST in-distribution and guaranteed upper bounds
on the confidences on OOD datasets within the l∞-ball of radius 0.3. Each histogram uses 50 bins
between 0.1 and 1.0. For better readability, the scale is zoomed in by a factor 10 for numbers below
one fifth of the total number of datapoints of the shown datasets. The vertical dotted line shows the
mean value of the histogram’s data.
MODEL MNIST FASHIONMNIST GUB EMNIST LETTERS GUB CIFAR-10 GUB UNIFORM GUB
PLAIN
OE
ACET
GOOD40
GOOD80
GOOD90
GOOD100
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Table 6: Histograms of the confidences on the SVHN in-distribution and guaranteed upper bounds
on the confidences on OOD datasets within the l∞-ball of radius 0.01. Each histogram uses 50 bins
between 0.1 and 1.0. For better readability, the scale is zoomed in by a factor 10 for numbers below
one fifth of the total number of datapoints of the shown datasets. The vertical dotted line shows the
mean value of the histogram’s data.
MODEL SVHN CIFAR-100 GUB CIFAR-10 GUB LSUN CLASSROOM GUB UNIFORM GUB
PLAIN
OE
ACET
GOOD40
GOOD80
GOOD90
GOOD100
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Table 7: Histograms of the confidences on the CIFAR-10 in-distribution and guaranteed upper
bounds on the confidences on OOD datasets within the l∞-ball of radius 0.01. Each histogram uses
50 bins between 0.1 and 1.0. For better readability, the scale is zoomed in by a factor 10 for numbers
below one fifth of the total number of datapoints of the shown datasets. The vertical dotted line shows
the mean value of the histogram’s data.
MODEL CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 GUB SVHN GUB LSUN CLASSROOM GUB UNIFORM GUB
PLAIN
OE
ACET
GOOD40
GOOD80
GOOD90
GOOD100
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H Evaluation on additional datasets
Table 8: A continuation of Table 1 for additional out-distributions. As in Table 1 the guaranteed
AUCs (GAUC) of the highlighted GOOD models are in general better than the adversarial (AAUC)
of OE (with the exception of Omniglot for MNIST).
IN: MNIST  = 0.3
METHOD ACC. 80M TINY IMAGES OMNIGLOT NOTMNIST
AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC
PLAIN 99.5 98.6 0.3 0.0 97.6 1.8 0.0 89.3 1.6 0.0
CEDA 99.5 100.0 88.0 0.0 98.5 23.5 0.0 99.9 98.4 0.0
OE 99.5 100.0 70.7 0.0 98.1 15.8 0.0 99.9 97.4 0.0
ACET 99.5 100.0 96.7 0.0 99.3 79.6 0.0 100.0 99.6 0.0
CCU 99.4 100.0 75.0 0.0 98.1 3.4 0.0 99.9 96.1 0.0
GOOD0 99.5 100.0 95.8 0.0 98.3 16.6 0.0 99.9 98.1 0.0
GOOD20 99.2 100.0 98.0 32.3 96.3 40.3 0.0 100.0 99.6 19.2
GOOD40 99.1 100.0 98.1 59.2 95.9 57.5 0.0 100.0 99.6 43.6
GOOD60 98.9 100.0 98.7 77.6 95.5 55.3 0.0 100.0 99.7 75.6
GOOD80 99.0 100.0 99.5 89.9 96.6 73.0 0.6 100.0 100.0 97.7
GOOD90 98.9 100.0 99.7 94.4 97.8 73.3 1.4 100.0 100.0 99.3
GOOD95 98.8 100.0 99.7 96.1 98.1 73.3 1.3 100.0 100.0 99.5
GOOD100 98.7 100.0 99.4 97.9 98.6 67.7 1.2 100.0 99.9 99.3
IN: SVHN  = 0.01
METHOD ACC. 80M TINY IMAGES IMAGENET- SMOOTH NOISE
AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC
PLAIN 95.5 95.3 60.7 0.0 95.5 61.0 0.0 95.8 36.7 0.0
CEDA 95.4 99.9 98.4 0.0 100.0 99.3 0.0 97.0 46.3 0.0
OE 95.5 100.0 97.8 0.0 100.0 98.7 0.0 96.7 44.7 0.0
ACET 95.6 100.0 99.8 0.0 100.0 99.9 0.0 98.9 77.1 0.0
CCU 95.7 100.0 97.9 0.0 100.0 99.3 0.0 97.1 67.3 0.0
GOOD0 97.0 100.0 95.9 0.0 100.0 97.9 0.0 98.1 38.2 0.0
GOOD20 96.5 99.9 99.0 20.5 99.9 99.7 33.3 97.9 63.2 0.0
GOOD40 96.1 99.9 98.9 44.1 100.0 99.7 62.3 98.0 69.2 0.0
GOOD60 95.8 99.9 99.5 66.1 100.0 99.9 82.2 98.2 74.9 0.0
GOOD80 95.9 99.6 99.4 88.4 99.6 99.6 95.6 98.1 72.1 0.0
GOOD90 96.3 99.9 99.7 96.1 100.0 99.9 99.0 98.4 79.9 2.3
GOOD95 96.2 99.8 99.7 98.0 99.8 99.8 99.5 97.9 73.1 3.4
GOOD100 96.6 99.9 99.8 99.5 99.9 99.9 99.8 97.5 82.5 65.5
IN: CIFAR-10  = 0.01
METHOD ACC. 80M TINY IMAGES IMAGENET- SMOOTH NOISE
AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC
PLAIN 90.1 85.9 12.0 0.0 83.5 9.7 0.0 90.2 10.2 0.0
CEDA 87.6 96.3 61.1 0.0 89.3 31.5 0.0 99.1 90.4 0.0
OE 90.5 97.4 33.7 0.0 90.3 20.6 0.0 99.4 37.3 0.0
ACET 89.1 96.8 89.1 0.0 89.3 75.6 0.0 99.5 96.8 0.0
CCU 91.6 96.8 33.7 0.0 92.0 30.0 0.0 99.5 38.0 0.0
GOOD0 89.6 96.7 47.7 0.0 91.0 22.8 0.0 97.3 30.6 0.0
GOOD20 86.4 95.5 63.7 15.6 87.0 44.3 5.6 96.6 81.6 42.0
GOOD40 89.6 95.0 82.8 38.4 88.3 60.5 25.2 96.9 96.8 34.9
GOOD60 89.8 94.8 81.4 49.5 87.0 62.6 36.4 97.5 96.6 49.5
GOOD80 90.0 94.0 83.2 59.4 84.0 65.3 47.5 97.7 95.8 54.8
GOOD90 90.2 92.1 78.5 64.1 79.6 61.7 51.9 95.3 89.5 81.2
GOOD95 90.3 86.7 72.0 64.1 75.5 58.4 52.0 88.7 68.1 46.2
GOOD100 90.3 77.5 49.5 35.4 74.1 45.7 33.0 95.6 93.2 92.8
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Extending the evaluation results presented in Table 1, we provide AUC, AAUC and GAUC values for additional
out-distribution datasets in Table 8. These datasets are:
• 80M Tiny Images, the out-distribution that was used during training. While it is the same distribution
as seen during training, the test set consists of 30,000 samples that are not part of the training set.
• Omniglot (Lake, B. M., Salakhutdinov, R., and Tenenbaum, J. B. (2015). Human-level concept
learning through probabilistic program induction. Science, 350(6266), 1332-1338.) is a dataset of
hand drawn characters. We use the evaluation split consisting of 13180 characters from 20 different
alphabets.
• notMNIST is a dataset of the letters A to J taken from different publicly available fonts. The dataset
was retrieved from https://yaroslavvb.blogspot.com/2011/09/notmnist-dataset.html.
We evaluate on the hand cleaned subset of 18724 images,
• ImageNet- [16], which is a subset of ImageNet [10] without images labelled as classes equal or similar
to CIFAR-10 classes.
• Smooth Noise is generated as described by [16]. First, a uniform noise image is generated. Then, a
Gaussian filter with σ drawn uniformly at random between 1.0 and 2.5 is applied. Finally, the image is
re-scaled such that the minimal pixel value is 0.0 and the maximal one is 1.0. We evaluate AUC and
GAUC on 30,000 samples.
For MNIST, GOOD100 has an excellent GAUC for the training out-distribution 80M Tiny images as well as
for notMNIST. For Omniglot, GOOD100 is again better than OE/CEDA (similar to EMNIST) in terms of clean
AUC’s but here ACET is slightly better. However, again it is very difficult to provide any guarantees for this
dataset even though non-trival adversarial AUC’s are possible.
For SVHN, the detection of smooth noise turns out to be the most difficult of the evaluated tasks. There, the
clean AUCs of all non-plain methods are lower than the perfect scores we see on other out-distributions but
still very high, and only GOOD100 can give some guarantees. An explanation might be that the image features
of SVHN house numbers and of this kind of synthetic noise are similarly smooth. For 80M Tiny Images and
Imagenet-, on the other hand, the SVHN high quantile GOOD models, particularly GOOD100, are able to provide
almost perfect guaranteed AUCs.
For CIFAR-10, on all three out-distributions we again observe the trade-off between clean and guaranteed AUC
that comes with the choice of the loss quantile. Overall, the GOOD80 model again retains reasonable AUC
values for the clean data while also providing useful guaranteed AUCs.
I Generalization of provable confidence bounds to a larger radius
In Table 9, we evaluate the generalization of empirical worst case and guaranteed upper bound for the confidence
within a larger l∞-ball around OOD samples than what the model was trained for.
As expected, the adversarial AUC’s (AAUC) degrade for the larger radius . However, we suspect that the
seemingly stronger robustness of CEDA compared to OE could be partially to due to the lack of gradients at the
initialization points. As mentioned above in general attacking all OOD models is difficult and requires adaptive
and transfer attacks to be successful. That said, the relative differences of the AAUC should still be meaningful.
However, this shows even more that for worst-case OOD detection provable guarantees are particularly needed.
On MNIST, GOOD100 not only still has a perfect guaranteed GAUC for uniform noise for an  of 0.4 but even
on FashionMNIST and CIFAR-10 it still has substantial guarantees. Moreover, GOOD100 has with the exception
of FashionMNIST a better AAUC than that of ACET.
For SVHN the excellent guarantees of GOOD100 for the radius of  = 0.01 models do not generalize well to the
significantly larger radius of  = 8/255 (but note that this is more than three times as large as at training time).
This is in particular the case for uniform noise where there are basically no guarantees anymore. Nevertheless
the adversarial AAUC is still very high and better than that of ACET.
In contrast, for CIFAR-10 the generalization of the bounds of GOOD80 to the larger radius of  = 8/255 is
surprisingly good: for all out-distributions, we only see an at most moderate drop of the GAUC value compared
to Table 1. The same is true for the AAUC which is now significantly better than that of ACET whereas for the
training radius of  = 0.01 ACET had a better AAUC.
In summary, GOOD in most cases still achieves reasonable guarantees for the larger threat model at test time.
Interestingly, the AAUC for the GOOD models is, with the exception of FashionMNIST, always better than that
of ACET and thus our guaranteed IBP training shows in this regard a better generalization to larger evaluation
radii than adversarial training on the out-distribution.
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Table 9: Complementing Table 1, an evaluation of the generalization of worst-case OOD detection,
that is AAUC and GAUC, for -values larger than those of the threat models used during training.
IN: MNIST  = 0.4
METHOD ACC. FASHIONMNIST EMNIST LETTERS CIFAR-10 UNIFORM NOISE
AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC
PLAIN 99.5 97.7 0.2 0.0 87.9 0.2 0.0 98.5 0.1 0.0 99.4 0.0 0.0
CEDA 99.5 100.0 71.0 0.0 92.8 8.9 0.0 100.0 80.2 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
OE 99.5 99.9 47.7 0.0 92.8 5.7 0.0 100.0 69.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
ACET 99.5 100.0 96.7 0.0 96.4 47.7 0.0 100.0 97.5 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
CCU 99.5 100.0 62.0 0.0 92.9 2.7 0.0 100.0 97.6 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
GOOD0 99.5 99.9 57.6 0.0 92.8 5.9 0.0 100.0 80.1 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
GOOD20 99.2 99.8 79.7 3.6 95.2 36.5 0.0 100.0 91.7 5.9 100.0 100.0 99.8
GOOD40 99.1 99.8 86.7 18.1 95.7 48.0 0.0 100.0 94.3 26.1 100.0 100.0 100.0
GOOD60 98.9 99.9 89.5 32.1 96.6 55.0 0.0 100.0 94.7 55.1 100.0 100.0 100.0
GOOD80 99.0 99.9 93.9 42.6 97.8 61.1 1.3 100.0 97.8 77.6 100.0 100.0 100.0
GOOD90 98.9 99.9 93.5 46.1 98.2 61.4 1.9 100.0 98.5 79.2 100.0 100.0 100.0
GOOD95 98.8 99.9 93.0 48.1 98.6 56.4 1.3 100.0 98.8 79.4 100.0 100.0 100.0
GOOD100 98.7 100.0 94.4 49.6 98.9 48.6 0.8 100.0 99.0 73.8 100.0 100.0 100.0
IN: SVHN  = 8/255
METHOD ACC. CIFAR-100 CIFAR-10 LSUN CLASSROOM UNIFORM NOISE
AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC
PLAIN 95.5 94.9 4.3 0.0 95.2 9.9 0.0 95.7 6.5 0.0 99.4 57.9 0.0
CEDA 95.4 99.9 76.1 0.0 99.9 80.8 0.0 100.0 89.9 0.0 100.0 99.9 0.0
OE 95.5 100.0 57.4 0.0 100.0 61.7 0.0 100.0 76.4 0.0 100.0 98.8 0.0
ACET 95.6 100.0 92.2 0.0 100.0 93.2 0.0 100.0 98.0 0.0 99.7 70.5 0.0
CCU 95.7 100.0 63.5 0.0 100.0 67.4 0.0 100.0 79.6 0.0 100.0 99.2 0.0
GOOD0 97.0 100.0 43.1 0.0 100.0 43.6 0.0 100.0 39.3 0.0 100.0 88.7 0.0
GOOD20 96.5 99.9 78.7 0.2 99.9 84.1 0.0 99.9 90.8 0.0 99.9 99.9 0.0
GOOD40 95.8 99.7 84.0 0.7 99.7 89.2 0.2 99.7 94.4 0.3 99.7 99.7 0.0
GOOD60 95.8 99.9 92.6 1.5 100.0 94.3 0.8 100.0 96.6 0.3 100.0 100.0 0.0
GOOD80 95.9 99.6 98.5 3.2 99.6 98.9 2.0 99.6 99.6 1.3 99.6 99.6 0.0
GOOD90 96.3 99.9 96.7 11.8 99.9 98.0 11.3 100.0 99.9 11.5 100.0 99.6 0.0
GOOD95 96.2 99.8 97.7 17.8 99.8 98.9 16.1 99.8 99.8 16.4 99.8 99.8 0.0
GOOD100 96.6 99.9 98.0 40.3 100.0 98.8 41.3 100.0 99.8 40.3 100.0 100.0 1.5
IN: CIFAR-10  = 8/255
METHOD ACC. CIFAR-100 SVHN LSUN CLASSROOM UNIFORM NOISE
AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC AUC AAUC GAUC
PLAIN 90.1 84.3 0.1 0.0 87.7 8.6 0.0 88.9 0.0 0.0 90.7 3.4 0.0
CEDA 87.6 90.9 13.9 0.0 97.6 14.1 0.0 98.0 22.0 0.0 98.0 41.1 0.0
OE 90.5 92.2 1.3 0.0 98.1 9.8 0.0 98.9 0.3 0.0 97.6 6.2 0.0
ACET 89.1 90.5 39.1 0.0 96.9 53.6 0.0 98.5 51.0 0.0 97.9 68.7 0.0
CCU 91.6 93.0 1.6 0.0 97.1 11.2 0.0 99.3 0.4 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
GOOD0 89.6 93.0 10.4 0.0 97.7 22.8 0.0 98.1 29.0 0.0 97.7 51.9 0.0
GOOD20 86.4 88.3 16.1 2.3 94.3 29.7 2.8 97.6 5.0 0.0 94.8 90.7 0.0
GOOD40 89.6 89.6 55.5 15.5 96.1 83.2 16.9 96.4 89.3 11.2 93.2 91.7 91.4
GOOD60 89.8 88.7 56.7 25.7 95.8 74.4 22.3 96.5 87.5 35.9 91.5 90.2 89.3
GOOD80 90.0 85.9 61.3 36.7 95.6 79.0 34.4 96.2 86.6 48.4 90.4 87.5 86.9
GOOD90 90.2 81.8 57.5 42.2 91.0 65.9 43.8 94.5 81.3 50.1 93.8 92.3 91.9
GOOD95 90.3 77.5 52.8 41.7 89.6 56.8 38.8 84.6 56.4 43.1 98.4 98.1 97.6
GOOD100 90.3 73.9 45.5 23.4 74.3 29.2 2.1 82.7 57.0 43.3 99.1 98.7 98.6
23
